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ABSTRACT
The report discusses European Political Cooperation (EPC) and 
its contributions to the political unification of Europe. The 
historical background is given in order to find out whether there 
has been progress in legal and institutional terms. Ttie structure 
of EPC is examined with the aim of understanding both the 
internal organization of EPC and its link with the EC (European 
Communityj policies and institutions. The contributions of EPC to 
the process of political unification of Europe besides its 
limitations, are discussed, while the fundamental philosophy 
behind this process is clearly drawn in the concluding chapter.
i 1
ÖZET
1969’da La Haye zirve konferansı sırasında Devlet ya da 
Hükümet Başkanlar ı, Topluluk Dışişleri Bakanltır ından, dış 
politika konusunda işbirliği olanakları üzerine bir rtıpor 
hazırlamalarını istemişlerdir. 1970’de Lüksemburğ’da toplanan 
Dışişleri Bakanları bu Lsteğe cevap veren "Davignon Raporu" nu 
kabul ettiler. Raporda önerilen uygulama biçimleri "Avrupa Siyasi 
İşbirliği" (ASİ) adı altında yürütülmektedir. 1986 yılında Avrupa 
Tek Senedi ile kurumsallaşan bu süreç, Avrupa Topluluğu’nun (AT) 
çıkarlarıyla ilgili uluslararası ilişkilerin çeşitli alanlarında, 
aşama aşama bilgi teatisi, danışma, görüş ve tavırların koordine 
edilmesi ve nihayet ortalı hareket etmeyi öngörmektedir. 
Başkanlık, Sekreterya ve Coreu telex sistemi gibi esnek ve 
pragmatik kurumlarıyla, Avrupa’nın karşılaştığı sorunlara ortak 
çözüm arayışlarına ve üye ülkelerin aralarındaki işbirliğini 
asgari düzeye ulaştırma çabalarına hizmet etmektedir. 
Devletlerüstü bir siyaset organına dönüşme ihtimali, üye 
ülkelerin farklı kültürel ekonomik sosyal bağlar ve milli 
çıkarlarla AT’da temsil edilmeleri sebebiyle, oldukça uzak 
görünmektedir. Ancak ASİ, dış politikada ortak bir strateji 
geliştirerek Avrupa’daki siyasal entegrasyonun oluşumutıu 
sağlayacak koşulların yaratılmasına olumlu yönde katkıda 
bulunmaktadır.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of ''European Political Cooperation" (EPC) first
emerged at the Hague Summit of 1969 where the siim was
expressed as "to achieve progress in the matters of political 1
unification." A year later it evolved into a more
specific target, i.e."to cooperate in the sphere of foreign 
2
policy." In this way, besides the "external relations" of
the EEC based on the Treaties and handled by the Community
institutions, foreign ministries of the member states from
then on began to work "intergovernmentally" on the basis of
legally non binding agreements, in the absence of formal and
permanent institutions. Although the idea of EPC vjas
initially perceived by some observers as a threat to the
achievements of the EC, to others it appealed as the second
3
"pillar" of European integration. It has developed its own 
habits and methods of problem-solving. Despite changes in 
personnel and in external conditions as well as changes in 
the number of its members over time, EPC has not suffered an 
institutional crisis. It was finally legalized by the Single 
European Act (SEA) in 1986.
1. The Hague Communique in Builet in-EC, no.1, 1970, pp. 11- 
18, part 15.
2. The Luxembourg Report in Bulletin-EC, no.11, 1970, pp. 9-
14, part two, introduction paragraph.
3. Elfriede Regelsberger, "EPC in the 1980s: Reaching
Another Plateau?", in: European Political Coopérât ion in 
t_he 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western
Europe?., ed: Alfred Pijpers Elfriede Regelsberger and
Wolfgang Wessels. (Dordrecht: 1988) p.4
EPC has left enough room for individual national foreign 
policies but at the same time has; been influencing national 
foreign policy-making in Western Europe. It has been mainly 
used to respond to external challenges on a collective basis 
on the one hand and to reduce tensions between its members 
through consensus-building means on the other. Yet its 
success has been limited to relatively minor issues, due to 
the lack of i>olLtical and financial resources and ether 
instruments for policy implementation and also due to the 
lack of consensus between its members on the means to be 
employed. Another shortcoming of EPC has been its failure to 
cooperate on matters of European security.
Despite these limitations, the multi-level and multi­
dimensional foreign policy activities represented by EPC in 
Western Europe have become a guide for the behaviour of the 
Community members. It evolved into a truly advanced model of 
"cooperation" between the membei* states, which enhanced the 
identity and status of Western Europe in world affairs. The 
initial consultation mechanism turned into a process 
promoting European interests in the world. Today’s Europe, 
which meets with new internal and external challenges such as 
the southern enlargement of the EC, the revolutionary changes 
in East-West relations, and German reunification, seems to 
need more than ever new models of cooperation among all 
European countries. If the revision of part III of the SEA
foreseen in 1992 becomes effective in adjusting EPC 
mechanisms to the rapidly changing international conjuncture, 
EPC will surely add much value to an active role of Europe in 
world politics.
However, what EPC has added to the process of political
unification in Europe is still a question to be answered. As
a matter of fact, the meaning of "Political Union" is
ambiguous and unclear. According to the Tindemans Report,
European Union (which is often called political union) is
expressed as a united front to the outside world, where
p]uropeans must tend to act in common in all the main fields
of their external relations whether in foreign policy,
security, economic relations or development aid. Further it
is argued that the development of the Union’s extei'nal
relations cannot occur without a parallel development of
common policies internally. European Union should be
concerned not only with foreign policy in the traditional
sense but also with all exteiTial economic, financial,
4
commercial and political activities. Nevertheless, the 
coordination mechanism of EPC would not be adequate to 
achieve the political unification of Europe. In order to 
reach political union, first of all a common political will 
and consensus should exist among the member states.
4. Panayiotis Ifestos, European Political Cooperation. 
Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy ?» Aldershot: 
Avebury, 1987, p. 194.
The process of integration in Western Europe was initiated
in the post World War II era, when the original member states
were involved in a process of economic and political
reconstruction· From the beginning, however, there v;ere
different views about the form of integration. A new
political framework in which the component nation states
would have a diminished role und^ r^ a strong common authority
was one option· It is generally known as the ”communitariari”
(supranational) approach. The second view took the Community
as an instrument to enable the member states to take
collective action without undermining their autoriomy and 
5
individuality. At the core of this ”intergovenmental” 
approach the nation states and their governmerits play a 
central role.
Although the Community was becoming an important cLCtor on 
the interriat ional economic stage and moving towards 
integration as an Economic Community, this was not the case 
in the foreign policy and defence fields. The functLonalist 
theoreticians foresaw an automatic ”spiLl~over effect’' of 
Community action from the economic into the political sphere. 
Whereas the federalists, particularly Monriet, who opposed 
automatic evolution, believed that it was first necessary to
5. Roy Pryce and Wolfgang Wessels, ''The Search for an Ever 
Closer Union: A Framework for Analysis”, in: The Dynamics ol’
European UrLi_on, ed.Roy Pryce, Groom Helm, London : 1 98 7 , p . 4 .
make economic union a fact of life and to develop concrete
links, then to move the Communities forward and strengthen
6
their institutions.
However, after the breakdown of efforts to create a 
Political Community and a European Defence Community, the 
basic strategy was shaped as "balancing" betweeri the 
communitarian body and the more co-operative (inter­
governmental) one. This dialectic of national power center 
and communitarian problem areas plays a role in how to 
develop a European Union.
My main purpose in this thesis is to find out whether and 
in which way EPC can be regarded as a contribution to the 
creation of a "European Union". In order to get an idea of 
this, I will try to explore the overall issue of European 
integration. I will try to find an answer to the question of 
whether the Community in the field of foreign affairs has 
already made a "qualitative leap" into a new phase of 
integration.
My starting point is an examination of the reports, plans 
and proposals for the development of EPC, in order to find 
out whether there has been a linear progress with respect to 
the achievements of EPC as a political and administrative 
structure for managing foreign policy issues and with respect
6. Pierre Gerbet, "In Search of Political Union: The Fouchet 
Plan Negotiations (1960-62)", in: The Dynamics of European 
Union, ed. Roy Pryce, Croom Helm, London: 1987, p. 107.
to the relationship between EPC and t.he politics and theory 
of integration. In this historical background I will follow a 
chronological order of analysis by examining the events which 
led to the emergence of the idea of EPC at the Hague Summit 
of 1969 and then, respectively, the Luxembourg Report, the 
Copenhagen Report and the London Report; and finally the 
legal and institutional changes introduced by the SEA. Other 
proposals and declarations which emanated from the existence 
and working of EPC like the Tindemans Report, the Genscher- 
Colombo Plan and the Solemn Declaration on European Union, 
will be dealt with separately.
In a second part the emphasis will be on the structure of 
EPC, the diplomatic machinery which has evolved in two 
directions: the internal organization of EPC, and the link 
between EPC and EC policies and its institutions. EPC’s 
working mechanisms, particularly the secretariat, the 
presidency and the Coreu system, will be examined in detail 
on the one hand, and the relation between EPC and the 
Commission of the Community, the European Parliament and EC 
policy measures, on the other.
In a short concluding chapter I ti'y to assess the 
contributions of EPC to the process of political unification 
of Europe. Furthermore, I will deal briefly with the 
relationship between the EPC process and the established body 
of integration "theories".
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Reports by the Foreign Ministers of Member States and the 
Single European Act.
By the late 1960s the European Community had achieved a 
high degree of economic cooperation, yet it did not have a 
common certain political aim or any institutional 
preparations for this purpose. However, the existence of the 
Community by itself was a political phenomenon. Despite this 
reality, foreign policy matters were handled by the 
governments of the member states but not within the scope of 
the Community. The efforts to step from the economic into the 
political sphere during the 1960s, like the Fouchet Plans, 
had failed.
In 1958, after returning to the Presidency, General de
Gaulle argued that France could regain its world power status
through new forms of cooperation among European sovereign
states; but he remained opposed to the idea of integration
and the notion of supranationality, because he believed that
these two items strengthened the division of Europe and its
dependence on the United States. It was for this reason that
the Fx'ench Government proposed a new consultative framework
for political cooperation outside the Community institutions.
Although the EEC Treaty foresees a "union among the peoples",
7
the Fouchet plan of 1961 recommended a "union of states". 
The plan also Included common foreign and defence policies
7. Eric Stein, "European Political Cooperation (EPC) as a 
component of the European Foreign Affairs System", in
Zei tschri f t für Ausländisches öf fent Liches Recht und
Völkerrecht 1983, vol: 43, No:1. p. 50
besides cooperation in terms of science, culture and human 
rights.
The Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers would meet
regularly in a "Council", and a "European Political
Commission" of senior national diplomats in Paris would
prepare the Council’s work. The Dutch and the Belgians
considered this proposal a threat to the foundations of Nato
and the Community. They were also scared of any establishment
of a Franco-German "directorate" which might put an end to
the institutional protection for the interest of the smaller
8
member states within the Community framework. Although de
Gaulle at that time explicitly opposed possible British
membership, particularly for the Dutch government political
cooperation could be accepted only with Britain’s
participation as a factor of balance between the European
countries and as a guarantor of an Atlantic Europe. In
general, the partners of France were all content with the
maintenance of foreign policy and defence within the
framework of Nato, and under the protection of the U.S.,
whereas the Fouchet Plan offered them a foreign and defence
policy without a credible guarantee to the smaller 
9
countries. The negotiations on the Fouchet plan ended in 
deadlock. We later on witness the withdrawal of France from
8. ibid., p. 51.
9. Gerbet, pp. 111-112.
Nato’s military structures, since De Gaulle had already
decided to set up a French nuclear force and had refused to
10
stock American nuclear arms in France.
In 1969 the French government under Pompidou withdrew its
opposition to the British membership of the Community, It was
in this context that a summit meeting at The Hague was
convened. Moving towards agreement on completion of the
Common Market and the creation of the Economic and Monetary
Union in the late 1960s created a suitable atmosphere for the
Heads of State and Government to believe that such progress
in the economic field had to be accompanied by steps which
11
would lead to political unification. Moreover, the growth
of the European regional commercial and economic system due
to the forthcoming start of enlargement negotiations with
other European states would have external political 
12
consequences.
Other factors that favoured the creation of EPC can be 
cited as following: Pompidou’s personal wish for a working
European unification process, Willy Brandt’s desire to 
"balance" his Ostpolitik with a concerted West European 
Policy, the growing desire of the Europeans to distinguish 
themselves from the United States, the awareness of the non­
existence of Europe on the international scene and
particularly after the crisis of 1973, the desire to be able
10. ibid., p. 109
11. Regelsberger, p.5
12. Ifestos, p. 148.
to react collectively to events that might pose a danger to
Western Europe, by pooling resources and increasing its
members capabilities in their dealings with the outside 
13
world. We can add to these the trend in Third World
regions to create blocs demanding either political or
economic concessions which compelled the Community to search
14
for ways of coordinating their foreign policies.
Another argument in order to explain the creation of EPC,
developed by Weiler, is that the main purpose of the process
was "reflexive", i.e. one had to compensate for the failures
of supranational (economic) integration with a new form of
integration which would be intergovernmental. He argues that
consultation on foreign policy and the formulation of joint
positions were a substitute for a true supranational 
15
integration.
1- The Hague Summit and the Luxembourg Report
Therefore in an international environment as described 
above, with the Community having completed the transitional 
period foreseen in the Treaty of Rome, the French President 
proposed an EEC summit which took place in The Hague on 1-2
13. Ilan Greilsammer, "European Political Cooperation: A
European Foreign Policy ?" in: The Jerusalem Journal of 
International Relations.Baltimore.Dec.1989 Vol 11 No.4, 
p. 53
14. Ifestos, p. 148.
15. J.H. Weiler, "The Evolution of a European Foreign Policy:
Mechanisms and Institutions", I.Greilsammer and J. 
Weiler, Europe and Israel: Troubled Neighbours (1988)
quoted by I. Greilsammer, p. 53.
10
December 1969. The Hague Summit was a landmark in European
integration in political terms. The European leaders were all
ready to present their political will and to take steps
toward "strengthening" and "deepening" European
16
integration. It was a significant attempt towards political 
unity in Europe.
The programme provided for policies which -would have
completed and strengthened the existing structures and
policies and enlarged the EC by including new member states,
on condition that the applicant states accepted the treaties
and their political finality and the decisions taken since
the entry into force of the treaties, i.e. what in
17
Community jargon is called the "acquis communautaire".
The Heads of State or Government agreed; "to instruct the
ministei’s for foreign affairs to study the best way of
achieving progress in the matter of political unification,
within the context of enlargement. The ministers would be
18
expected to report before the end of July 1970" , thus
"paving the way for a United Europe capable of assuming its
responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a
contribution commensurate with its traditions and its 
19
missions".
16. Ifestos, p. 151
17. The Hague Communique, in Bulletin-EC, no.1,1970, pp.11-18
18. The Hague Communique, para. 15
19. The Hague Communique, para. 3.
11
For that purpose a committee composed of the political
directors of the member states foreign ministries under the
chairmanship of the Belgian political director Etienne
20
Davignon prepared a report. The report was approved by the
Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Luxembourg on 27
October 1970. In the Luxembourg Report the Ministers proposed
that "to achieve progress towards political unification, the
Governments should decide to cooperate in the field of21
foreign policy." The report emphasized . that this
22
cooperation has two objectives:
(a) To ensure greater mutual understanding with respect to 
the major issues of international politics, by exchanging 
information and consulting regularly;
(b) To increase their solidarity by working for
harmonization of views, concerting of attitudes, and joint
action when it appears feasible and desirable.
According to the report, foreign ministers were to meet
23
"at least every six months". In the event of a serious
crisis or special urgency, an extraordinary consultation was
24
to be arranged between the governments of member states. 
The President-in-office was given charge of it. Yet it was 
not until the London Report (1981) that a special formula and
20. Hence, the report Is often called the "Davignon Report".
21. The Luxembourg Report, in Bulletin-EC, no:11, 1970, pp.9- 
14 part two.
22. The Luxembourg Report, Part Two, para 1.
23. ibid.. Part two, II-l (a)
24. ibid.. Part two, II-l (c)
12
a specific procedure for emergency meetings was to be 
established.
The main institution proposed was a Political Committee
composed of the heads of the political departments of the
national foreign ministries. Thej^  were to meet "at least four
times a year" to prepare the ministerial meetings and carry
25
out any tasks delegated to them by the ministers. The
committee was also authorized to set up "working parties" and
"panel of experts" or to institute "any other form of
26
consultation" necessary for special tasks.
The Governments were entitled to consult each other on all
27
major questions of foreign policy, yet there was no
commitment to agree. If the task undertaken by the ministers
affected the activities of the EC, then the Commission would 
28
be consulted. It was also agreed to hold an informal
meeting every six months with the Political Committee of the
29
European Parliament. Secretarial and organizational
arrangements were to be responsibility of the country holding
the presidency of the Council of Ministers of the EC.
30
Meetings would also take place in that country’s capital.
In part three of the report (paragraph 3) the Political 
Committe was asked to report back to the Ministers on the
25 . ibid., Part two, III-l
26. ibid., Part two, III-3
27. ibid., Part two, IV
28. ibid., Part two, V
29. ibid., Part two, VI
30. i b_i jd · 1 Part two, VII
13
given tasks at each of their half-yearly meetings. Moreover,
in paragraph 4, the President-in-office of the Council was
supposed to provide the European Parliament with a progress
rijport on the work in question. The Luxembourg Report had
also stipulated that the applicant countries would "have to
accept the goals and procedures of political cooperation" as
31
they became community members.
As can be deduced from the report, although it was thought
appropriate to distinguish EPC from the other Community
institutions, the correlation between the new framework and
32
the objective of European political Integration is obvious. 
The European Communities were considered to be the original 
nucleus of European unity and furthermore, a United Europe 
was declared to be the fundamental aim. Yet in EPC there was 
no obligation or commitment to take decisions or to comply 
with certain decisions. Its existence was not based on any 
treaty. It was a procedure rather than an institutional 
structure.
2. The Copenhagen Report
During the Paris Summit of October 1972 it was evident 
that the political will which existed in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s began to weaken. Especially, the trend of linking 
progress in political cooperation with the aim of political
31. ibid.. part four.
32. Ifestos, p. 153.
14
union was almost left side. So the results of the summit as
regards political cooperation and political union were not
impressive. What is worth mentioning here is that the Heads
of State during the summit instructed the Foreign Ministers
to prepare a second report on European Political 
33
Cooperation. Since the enlargement of the European
Communities was to become effective on 1 January 1973, this 
second report dealt basically with methods and pi'ocedures for 
improving political cooperation. The Middle East war and 
subsequent energy crisis, political changes in the Iberian 
peninsula,the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, and finally 
the detente between the two superpowers played an important 
role in reinforcing a decision by the ministers to agree on a 
detailed strvicture of consultations in order to assume .joint 
positions in different areas.
The Copenhagen Report of 1973 noted that the habit of
working together had become a "reflex" of coordination, which
had affected the relations of the member states between each
other and with third countries. This collegiate sense in
Europe was becoming a real force in international
34
relations.
The Copenhagen Report was an initiative to dr£iw a
framework for the future development of EPC. In a way the
33. Because, the report was submitted to the Heads of State 
in the 1973 Copenhagen Summit, it is called "Copenhagen 
Report".
34. The Copenhagen Report, in BuLletin-EC. No:9, 1973 pp.14- 
21, Part I,para 5.
15
report gave EPC its final character, it established its
'working rules’ throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and it formed
an integral part of the accumulation of reports and practices
35
which make up EPC. The report attributes a specific role 
to EF^ C in international politics:
"In the light of this it is essential
that, in the spirit of the conclusions of the
Paris Summit Conference, cooperation amohg the
Nine on foreign policy should be such as to
enable Europe to make an original contribution
to the international equilibrium. Europe has the
will to do this, in accordance with its intei'est
in progress, peace and cooperation. It will do
so loyal to its traditional friends and to the
alliances of its Member States, in the spirit of
good neighbourliness which must exist between
all the countries of Europe both to the East and
the West, and responding to the expectations of
36
all the developing countries."
By referring to the 'traditional friends’ and tFie 
'alliances of the member states’ the report addressed the 
U.S., Europe’s security guarantor. As we see, within today’s 
circumstances, the role assumed by EPC in the eyes of the
35. Ifestos, p. 167.
36. the Copenhagen Report, Part I, para 12.
16
Member States gains significance with respect to the changing
international conjuncture and East-West relations.
Compared to the Luxembourg Report, the Copenhagen Report
introduced new principles to the .working mechanism of EPC.
First of all, the Foreign Ministers were supposed to meet
four times a year instead of twice a year. They were
permitted to consult each other on specific subjects betweeri
3 7
meetings, if it was necessary.
The responsibilities undertaken by the Political Directors
of the Member States, i.e. the Political Committee, remained
more or less the same yet, instead of meeting four times a
year, they were thought to meet "as frequently as the
38
intensification of the work requires".
An important innovation was the establishment of "a group
consisting of European Correspondents in the foreign 
3 9
ministry" responsible for the management of a special 
comnmnication network called the CORFU system of telegrams. 
The aim of this new institution was both to contribute to 
confidence-building inside the "club" and to the 
stabilization of the system. The CORFU (Correspondance 
Européenne) offered continuous communication on any 
international topic diplomats wished to raise.. In this way 
the "coordination reflex" and a certain esprit de corps 
became major characteristics of foreign policy-making at the
37. ibid., Part II, para 1.
38. .ibid.. Part II, para 2
39. ibid., Part II, para 3
17
European level.
The report also provided for regular contacts,
consultations and meetings among the staffs of the members’
diplomatic representations in each others’ capitals, in third
41
countries, and in international organizations.
Administrative assistance was foreseen by other member states
to the presidency for specific tasks since the presidency was
considered to present a particularly heavy administrative
burden for the respective government in charge of this 
42
task.
The report moreover provided for four colloquies each year 
with the European Parliament’s Political Committee, and the 
Political Committee of EPC was given the task of drawing to 
the attention of the foreign ministers proposals adopted by 
the European Parliament on foreign policy questions. The 
foreign ministers’ willingness to inform the Political 
Committee of the European Parliament was regarded as a step 
towards greater democratic control over the intergovernmental 
machinery of EPC.
Yet the effective control of the Parliament over EPC was 
not realized. The national parliaments exercise influence 
over EPC only to the extent that they can influence their 
respective foreign ministers. However, at the European level, 
the European Parliament is the only institution V'/hich
40
40. Regelsberger, p. 11
41. The Copenhagen Report, Part II, para 6-7.
42. ibid., Part II, para.8
18
provides a foium for democratic control of the operation and
activities of EPC but this control was still exercised
indirectly through the national parliaments. The European
Parliament’s control over EPC remained consultative. It could
exert moral influence on Ministers for Foreign Affairs or
even on public opinion, but it had no legal .jurisdiction over
EPC activities. Thus the Copenhagen Report could not provide
any solution to the question of democratic control and
effective jurisdiction of foreign policy issues handled by 
43
EPC. The report only foresaw four colloquies each year at
which the Foreign Ministers would meet with members of the
Political Committee of the EP, in addition to a communication
on progi'ess made in the field of political cooperation
submitted by the President to the EP once a year. 44
The report, furthermore, made a distinction between the
work of the political cooperation machinery and that carried
out within the framework of the European Communities.
Although both sets of machinery were considered to have the
same aim, i.e. contribution to the development of European
unification, a sort of official differentiation was made foi­
ls
the first time.
As well as this it was accepted that if the Community 
activities overlapped with those of the EPC, close contact
43. Ifestos, pp. 169-170
44. The Copenhagen Report, Part II, para. 10
45. ibid., Part II, para. 12 (a)
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would be maintained with the institutions of the Community.
For example, the Commission would be* invited to make known
its views in accordance with current practices. In addition
to that, the Presidency would keep the EC Council informed 
46
accordingly.
The Copenhagen Report can be regarded as one of the
cornerstones of the EPC establishment. It shows the limits
that institutional arrangements can reach in terms of foreign
policy cooperation on the one hand, and the fundamental
objective of the EPC machinery on the other. The report
reflected the view that EPC should be kept distinct from the
EC and in the hands of national officials. Setting up a group
of correspondents and putting emphasis on the role of the
presidency instead of establishing a common secretariat were
good examples to that point. However, although the report
mentioned "the development of European Unification" it
indicated "coordination" rather than increased cooperation or
common foreign policy. Furthermore, the changes brought about
Ijy the Copenhagen Report were mainly a formalization of the
intergovernmental practices that had been developed by EPC
since the Luxembourg Report. Its principal characteristics
remained the same: a mechanism for common analysis,
reciprocal exchange of information and common public-
47
statements when views did not fundamentally diverge.
46. ibid.. Part II, para. 12 (c)
47. Ifestos, pp. 172-173.
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3. The London Report
In 1980 the Foreign Ministers of the ten member states of
the European Community sought ways and means to improve the
development of European Political Cooperation. In doing so
they were motivated by the crises of the 1970s such as the
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, the hostage-taking in
Teheran, the I ran-Iraq war, the detoi'iation of East-West
relations, and by Europe’s inability to influence these 
48
ev'ents. Thus a third report on European Political
Cooperation was approved by the European Council in London on 
13 October 1981.
The member states seemed to attach greater importance to
the idea of presenting themselves as a unitary actor in world 
49
politics:
"The Foreign Ministers believe that in a
period of increased world tension and
uncertainty the need for a coherent and united
approach to international affairs by the members
of the European Community is greater than
ever... it is their conviction that the Ten
should seek increasingly to shape events and not
50
merely to react to them."
48. Greilsammer, p. 54
49. Regelsberger, p. 2
50. The London Report, Bulletin-EC, No:3, 
para. 5
1981, pp. 14-17
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With his election as French president in 1981 François
Mitterand and a former Commissioner, Claude Cheysson, as
Foreign Minister, elevated the "European Policy" to a higher-
place in the French government’s priorities. Besides, the
hard-line stance of the new American administration of
President Ronald Reagan regarding East-West relations also
forced the Eluropeans, who were very much attached to detente,
51
to formulate an independent common foreign policy. Without
chcinging the fundamental intergovernmental character of the
EPC structure, pragmatic improvements of the political
cooperation machinery were sought. The London Report is
significant in terms of EPC process since it introduced
substantial developments compared to the Luxembourg and
Copenhagen Reports. Much of these had, however, been
established in EPC practice after 1973.
One of the new features of the London Report was the
establishment of a "crisis procedure". This offered the
possibility of meetings at ministerial level and directorial
level and of ambassadors of the Ten in third countries within
forty-eight hours at the request of three member states.
Working groups were instructed to identify possible
international crises at an early stage and to prepare
52
adequate strategies to act.
51. Greilsammer, p. 54
52. Regelsberger, p. 21
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Afiother point dif i’erenciat irvg the London Fieport from the 
two previous ones was the security issue. TFie report says 
tFiat:
"As regards the scope of European
Political Cooperation and having regard to tlie
different situations of the Member States, the
Foreign Ministers agree to maintain tFie flexible
and pragmatic approacFi whicFi has made it
possible to discuss in political cooperation
certain important foreign policy questions
53
bearing on the political aspects of security."
As we can understand from the quotation above, thex'e was
no commitment to deal with the political aspects of security.
It was up to the political will of the Member States. The
military aspects of security but also important political
security issvies Fiad been avoided since tFie failure of tFie EDO
54
(European Defence Community) scheme in 1954. Furthermore,
tFie defence of Western Europe was the responsibility of
Nato. However, Ireland was not a member of Nato on the one
hand and some otFier Nato members such as Norway and Turkey
were not EEC members on tFie other. Therefore many members did
not want the Community to become involved in security 
55
matters. Other factors wFiicFi kept tFie defence and military
53. The London Report, para.66
54. Ifestos, p. 295.
55. The Economist, "Europe’s Fledging Foreign Policy", 4 Dec. 
1982, p. 59.
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aspects of security out of subject were the continued
resilience of Nato, inhibitions about reviving an independent
German military machine and the sheer cost of preferring
56
self-reliance to American leadership. In fact it is really
difficult to draw a line between those matters which are for
EPC discussion and those which are to be kept for Nato. For
instance, the Helsinki Final Act, the consequences of the
invasion of Poland, and military aid to Afghanistan, have all
57
been on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers. Therefore, 
"political" rather than "defence" aspects of security was 
referred to in order not to undermine Nato consultations. As 
a result, we can say that the European Community certainly 
did not achieve a defence or military dimension in the London 
Report.
In institutional terms although the report did not change
the fundamental characteristics of EPC, it introduced
pragmatic and effective arrangements. It provided assistance
to the President-in-office by his colleagues from the
58
preceding and succeeding presidencies the Troika, since 
his role as spokesman in the European Parliament and in 
contacts with third countries had increased. The ten member 
states also agreed to "attach importance to the
Commission of the European Communities being fully
56. Cristopher Hill, "Changing Gear in Political 
Cooperation", in The Polit leal Quarterly, London, Jan.- 
March 1982, Vol: 53, No : 1, p. 56.
57. ibid., p. 56
58. The London Report, part II, para. 10
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associated with Political Cooperation, at all levels" which 
means that the Commission achieved the right of participating 
in ever5' deliberative meeting of EPC. Yet the legal and 
procedural distinction between economic matters under the 
authority of the EEC and political matters under the EPC 
machinery still continued to exist. On the other hand, the
Member States accepted "to provide for Political Cooperation
60
meetings on the occasion of Foreign Affairs Council”, which 
was a real step forward.
As the London Report mentions, EPC had become."a central
element in the foreign policies of all memVier states" . Yet it
was still a political commitment and not a legal one based on
treaty obligations. However, compared to the previous
reports, we can argue that there was a quite stronger
political commitment in this report, despite its vague
wording. To make this clear, we can compare some of the
general points of the three reports. For instance, in the
Luxembourg Report a necessity for the member states to step
up their political cooperation and to provide themselves with
ways and means of harmonizing their views in the field of
international politics was recognized. The Foreign Ministers
were eager to show to the outside world that Europe has a
political vocation and to give Europeans a keener awareness
61
of their common responsibility. Therefore they proposed 
that the governments should decide to cooperate in the field
59. ibid.. Part II, para. 12
60. .ibid., Part II, para. 12
61. The Luxembourg Report, Part I, para. 10
25
of foreign policy, being concerned to achieve progress 
towards political unification. The objectives of this 
cooperation were:
- to exchange information and consult regularly and thus 
ensure better mutual understanding on international affairs.
- to harmonize views and positions and when it appears
62
feasible and desirable, joint action.
In the Copenhagen Report, however, a sort of evolution
can be observed. First of all, each state agreed to undertake
as a general rule not to take up final positions without
prior consultation with its partnei's within the framework of
the political cooperation machinery. Therefore governments
would consult each other on all important foreign policy
questions. The purpose of the consultation was to seek common
policies on practical problems. Furthermore, they agreed that
the subjects dealt with should coricern European interests
whether in Europe itself or elsewhere where the adoption of a
63
common position is necessary or desirable.
In the London Report, in addition to their commitment to 
consult partners before adopting final positions or launching 
national initiatives, the ten Foreign Ministers undertook 
that in these consultations each of them would take full 
account of the position of other partners and would give due 
weight to the desirability of achieving a common position.
62. ibid., part II, para. 1
63. The Copenhagen Report, Part II,para. 11
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They also noted that it became increasingly possible foi* the
Ten to speak with one voice in international affairs. They
emphasized that not mei'ely a common attitude, but joint
action, which has always been an objective of European
Political Cooperation, should be increasingly within
64
the capacity of the Ten.
As we can see, the political commitment in terms of 
political cooperation gets stronger in succeeding reports; 
or, as a close observer of the EPC development has put it:
"The common enterprise has to begin with a loose
non-binding and modest formula, through which a
process of developing trust can be initiated...
Gradual development does justice to the
individual interests of the participants and is
flexible enough to avoid deviation and special
requests without any irreparable breaks. If the
process is thus flexibly organized the actors
can accumulate an increasing body of common
positions if they are confronted with the
"right" challenges which ultimately create the
preconditions for qualitative changes of 
65
cooperation."
64. The London Report, Part I, para. 7 and 8.
65. W. Wessels, "EPC: A New Approach to Foreign Policy", in:
European Political Cooperation: Towards a Foreign Policy
for Western Europe, ed. D. Allen, R. Rummel and W. 
Wessels, Institute für Europäische Politik, Bonn: 1982, 
p. 17
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4. The Single European Act (SEA)
In the early 1980s there was a need to affirm Europe’s
political identity in the world. There was a stalemate over
the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and an
66
ongoing crisis over the Community budget. Moreover,
national elections and the prospect of further enlargement of
the EC to the South could have some negative effects on the
67
system as a whole.
In these circumstances the European Parliament took the
initiative and voted for the "Draft Treaty establishing the
68
European Union" on 14 February 1984 which was "a
commitment to pluralistic democracy, human rights and the
rule of law, the promotion of international peace and
liberty, and the construction of an ever closer union in
Europe". The Draft Treaty proposed to bring political
cooperation under the auspices of the Union. Political
cooperation matters were treated in articles 63 to 69. Yet
it seems that the Draft Treaty attempted to preserve the EPC
system at its present stage of evolution, with respect to it,s
competences and definition of roles, while introducing it
69
into the framework of the Treaty. On the other hand.
66. Ifestos, p. 329.
67. Regelsberger, p. 28
68. The Draft Ti’eaty was prepared by a Committee under the 
leadership Altiero Spinelli.
69. Peter Brückner, "Foreign Affairs Powers and Policy in the
Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union", in: An
Ever Closer Union. eds. Bieber, Jacque and Weiler, 
European Perspectives, Commission of the EC, Brussels: 
1985, p. 132.
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the Treaty attempted to introduce some pragmatism such as
art. 68 which flexibly distinguishes between cooperation and
common action in international relations and puts the conduct
of these two processes under the decision of the European 
70
Council. Articles 65, 67 and 69 refer to the delegation of 
powers and roles to the Commission and the European 
Parliament which it was difficult for the member states to 
accept.
The purpose of the SEA, however, was less ambitious. It
aimed at transforming what already existed of EPC procedures
and practices into a legal text. So, by the SEA, EPC was
given a legal form. Yet both the preamble and article 1 of
the SEA linked the European Communities and EPC while making
clear that they were legally separate. Art 1 says that; "The
European Communities and European Political Cooperation shall
have as their objective to contribute together to making
concrete progress towards -European Unity". The Act
furthermore explained the fact that the European Communities
were founded on the Treaties of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) , the European Economic Community (EEC), the
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the subsequent
Treaties and Acts, whereas EPC would be governed by Title III 
71
of the SEA. In other words, though EPC was codified in a 
legal text, the member states did not decide to integrate it
70.  i b i d . ,  p . 138
71. The Single European Act, Bulletin-EC, Supplement 2/1986, 
Title I, art. 1
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fully into the Community system in legal terms.
As a matter of fact the SE.A was not an "innovation” but 
was rather a repetition of already existing reports. It only 
introduced some subtle new features. Article 30 confirmed the 
undertaking of the members of the European Communities:
a. to formulate and implement jointly a European foreign
73
policy.
b. to Inform and consult each other on any foreign policy
74
matters of general interest before they decide on their
75
final position.
c. to take into consideration the position of the other 
partners while adopting their own position and their own 
national interests.76
The Act still lacks a binding decision-making framework,
since the EPC Treaty had no legal instruments of enforcement.
Moreover, due to its vague terminology, the degree of
commitment was hard to defirie.
The Commission was said to be "fully associated with the
77
proceedings of Political Cooperation". It was moreover 
entitled to ensure, together with the Presidency, that there 
is consistency between the policies of the EC and those of
72
72. Ifestos, p. 353
73. The Single European Act, Title III, art 30, para. 1
74. ibid., art 30, para 2 (a)
75. ibid., art 30, para 2 (b)
76. ibid.. art 30, para 2 (c)
77. ibid.. art 30, para 3 (b)
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EPC, So in a way the Commission would act as ei coordinating
organ between the EC and EPC, bvit was not given any power or
jurisdiction as a participant in EPC. The Presidency was
charged to inform the European Parliament regularly of the
foreign policy issues being examined within the framework of
EPC, and also the views of the European Parliament would he
79
duly taken into consideration. So the role of the EP
remained modestly consultative.
Apart from backing the EPC procedure by a legal text and
putting an end to its ad hoc charttcter the only Innovation
was the establishment of a secretariat based in Brusstils to
assist the Presidency in preparing and implementing the
80
activities of EPC and in administrative matters. Yet it 
was not given any competence for initiatives sinc;e it would 
carry out Its duties under the authority of the Presidency.
The Member States in paragraph 6 of Article 30 agreed to 
cooperate on questions of European security and to coordinate 
their positions more closely on the political and "economic" 
aspects of security. Though the political aspects of security 
was already mentioned in the London Report of 1981, the 
economic aspects were newly added. The main point is that 
the Member States expressed their determination and 
willingness in a legal document to cooperate on security for
78
78. ibid., art 30, para 5
79. ibid., art 30, para. 4
80. ibid., art 30, para. 10 (g)
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the first time, by putting emphasis on maintaining the
technological and industrial conditions necessary for their
security. It was also stressed that the EPC Treaty v/ould not
pose any obstacle to closer cooperation in the field of
security between certain of the member states within the
framework of the Western European Union (WEU) or the Atlantic 
82
Alliance. The distinction between the political and
military aspects of security was again maintained, as it was 
in the London Report.
In a nutshell, the Single European Act did not bring any 
fundamental change to the EPC machinery. Its working methods, 
its legal and institutional differentiation from the EEC 
institutions, and its role and contributions to European 
integration, almost remained unchanged. Nevertheless, the SEA 
gave it a legal form but not a new content or new commitments 
and obligations in general.
If we take a brief look at the development of EPC from the 
Luxembourg Report to the SEA, with respect to its 
contributions to political unification, we can argue that EPC 
is formally acknowledged as an important approach towards 
European Union. EPC, in its initial phase, was involved 
extensively in institutional questions and procedural 
details. For instance, the Luxembourg Report contained mainly 
the procedural arrangements of EPC. After the Copenhagen
81
81. Ifestos, p. 356
82. The Single European Act, art 30, para. 6 (c)
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Report EPC developed into a sui generis network by which the 
member states could exchange views, harmonize their national 
policies on certain international issues, and act in common 
in some specific cases. The London Report was an attempt to 
refine EPC as the focus of Western European collective 
diplomacy. The member countries seemed to attach greater 
importances to the idea of presenting themselves as a unitary 
actor in world politics. By the SEA of 1986, for the first 
time in its history political cooperation was given a legal 
basis. The political esommitment to cooperate on foreign 
policy matters was transformed into a legal obligation. The 
SEA in a way confirmed the re:>le of EPC in furthering thes 
integration process.
EPC has become a major procedure for foreign policy-making 
both at the national and the collective European level. It is 
not a minor affair in the process of European integration 
either. Politicians and diplomats became familiar with the 
European dimension of their national foreign policy more and 
more through EPC institutions and working methods. All the 
procedural improvements, from the Luxembourg Report to the 
SEA, are based on the assumption that EPC is a cooperation 
among sovereign states, each of which has strong individual 
traditions and national interests in terms of foreign policy. 
In these circumstances it would not be wise to expect a 
transfer of loyalties from the national level to the new
33
centre of collective decision-making as it has been 
suggested by the neo-functionalist theory of integration 
processes.
B, Other Proposals and Declarations Which Take up the Issue 
of Foreign Policy Cooperation
Although they are not directly related to EPC in the way 
tVie three Reports and the SEA are, the Tindemans Report and 
the Genscher-Colombo Plan and, as a consequence, the Solemn 
Declaration need to be mentioned. These were attempts to meet 
the challenges of European Union which occured either in the 
international environment or within the Community, by drawing 
attention to less controversial areas, opening new avenues 
like political cooperation or by creating a positive climate 
for available solutions. Despite their shortcomings and 
failures, the lessons derived from these initiatives for 
political integration are still valid. Particularly in the 
Tindemans Report there are some long-range positive 
elements. Before the Tindemans Report, in the 1972 Paris 
Summit meeting, a form of "European Union" was foreseen, but 
the term "European Union" was rhetoric then. The Report 
however gave a more or less definite meaning to this word.
1. The Tindemans Report
During the Paris Summit of December 1974, Leo Tindemans, 
Prime Minister of Belgium, was nominated to draw up a
34
comprehensive report to the heads of government after
consulting the European institutions, the governments, and
83
economic and social groups within the Community. The report
would define the concept and content of "European Union".
His report consisted of a set of general guidelines from
which legally binding texts could be derived. In the letter
accompanying his submission of the report he mentioned that
Europe would only fulfil its destiny if it espoused 
84
federalism.
According to Tindemans the European idea lost its momentum
due to the lack of common political will and consensus,
without which the move from economic integration to political
became difficult. This problem furthermore prevented Europe
from acquiring its own personality in defence and
85
security matters and a unified approach in world affairs. 
Tindemans also argued in his report that "the European Union 
should not only be concerned with foreign policy in the
traditional sense but also with all external economic
relations; that is. the Union’s foreign policy must include
all economic. financial, commercial and political
86
activities".
Tindemans, on the oth63r hand, suggested a single
83. Jacques Vandamme, "The Tinderaans Report (1975-76)" in: 
The Dynamics pX European Union. ed. Roy Pryce, Groom 
Helm, London: 1987, p. 150.
8 4. ibid., p. 159.
85. Ifestos, p. 194 
8 6. ibid., p. 194
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decision-making centre by putting an end to the distinction 
between Community affairs and Political Cooperation, in other 
words, the distinction between EPC and meetings of 
Foreign Ministers. He recommended the "Council of Ministers" 
as the central authority.
He proposed to transform the political undertaking of the
Member States into a legal obligation with the help of a
protocol reformulating paragraph 11 of the 1973 Copenhagen 
87
Report which anticipated consultation on all important
foreign policy questions among the Governments.
Tindemans was aware of the fact that steps tov/ard European
Union should be-gradual and based on realities. He named it a
88
"qualitative progress". For this reason he adopted a fii'm
"communautaire" line in his report, calling for the
absorption of the political cooperation machinery into the
legal framework of the Treaties of Rome, but this evoked
89
little positive response. The report proposed four areas 
where obligatory consultation was considered as a commitment 
before establishing a common or majority position. They 
were: the new world economic order; relations between Europe
and the United States; security; and crises occuring within
87. Vandamme, p. 160
88. ibid., p. 159
89. David Allen and William Wallace, "European Political
Cooperation: the Historical and Contemporary Background", 
in: European Political Cooperation: Towards a Foreign
Policy for Western Europe; ed. D Allen, R. Rummel and W. 
Wessels, Institut für Europäische Politik, Bonn: 1982, p. 
31.
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Europe’s immediate geographical surroundings. However,
efforts to reach an agreement on the programme proposed by
Tiridemans failed, mainly because the political and economic
climate in Europe was not favourable to grand political
projects at the moment when the Report came under
91
discussion.
2. The Genscher-Colombo Plan and the Solemn Declaration on 
European Union.
The Genscher-Colombo initiative, unlike the Tindemans
92
Report, was taken outside any institutional framework.
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, German Foreign Minister, speaking
in Stuttgart on 6 January 1981, called for a new treaty to
establish a common European foreign policy. He expressed his
own views on European Union, putting the emphasis on
Europe’s political rather than economic needs.
At that time the Community’s forthcoming enlargement
b>" Greece, and the prospect of Spanish and Portuguese
membership, necessitated a deepening of its policies and
decision-making mechanisms. The worsening of European-
American relations on issues of detente and the Middle East
problems like the invasion of Afghanistan were other factors
93
which contributed to this new approach.
90. ibid., p. 166
91. Vandamme, pp. 160-161
92. Gianni Bonvicini, "The Genscher-Colombo Plan and the
Solemn Decleration on European Union",in: The Dynamics of 
Euorpean Union. ed. Roy Pryce, London, Crcom Helm,
1987, p. 174.
9 3. ibid., p. 175.
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In these circumstances Genscher declared the main
objectives of European Union as: development of a common
European foreign policy; extension of the scope of economic
cooperation, agreement on security policy; closer
94
cooperation in the cultural sector and legal harmonization.
Yet, as with the Tindemans Report, the initiative was not
intended to result in an immediate European Union, but as a
step forward in this process.
The Italian Foreign Minister, Emilio Colombo, in a
speech in Florence on 28 January 1981 in support of his
German colleague, expressed similar views on this attempt
toward European Union. However, his concern was much more
about the development of the Community’s economic policy.
These differences in terms of motivations and perceptions
between Colombo and Genscher could be observed particuJ.ariy
in the letters that they sent with a copy of the joint plan
to their colleagues and to the pi’esidents of the Commission
95
and the European Parliament.
The two major objectives of the Bonn-Rome initiative
were, first, to formalise EPC and draw it functionally closer
to the EEC, and second, to introduce security into the scope
96
of Community’s deliberations. However, due to the dilemmas
within the Community itself, Gtinscher at the end agreed
that , instead of a new treaty, a declaration to reform
94. ibid., p. 176.
95. ibid., p. 178.
96. The Financial Times, 8 May 1981, p. 2.
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institutions and to define the main objectives of European
97
Union would be sufficient. The examination of the
Genscher-Coiombo Plan by the member states lasted for two 
years. The long diplomatic and political negotiations finally 
resulted in the "Solemn Decleration on European
Union" of the European Council on 19 June 1983, in
Stuttgart.
The Genscher-Coiombo Plan originally had proposed:
(a) to give the European Council a strategic role in 
the common decision-making structure in a permanent and 
definitive way;
(b) to establish a single Council of Ministers 
responsible both for EC and EPC matters;
(c) to create new specialised ministerial councils, 
including culture and defence;
(d) a return to majority voting in the Council and 
adoption of a new procedure designed to reduce the use of the 
veto;
(e) to extend the role of the European Parliament in 
terms of its authority and power of intervention;
(f) to strengthen the role of the Presidency and to
98
create a small secretariat for EPC.
Yet In the Stuttgart Decleration the innovations 
about the European Council, the idea of a single Council of 
Ministers and new specialised ministerial councils, were not
97. The Financial Times, 16 Nov. 1981, pp. 1-2.
98. Bonvicini, 1987, p. 183.
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even taken into account. There was only rhetorical
empliasj.s on the importance of the European Parliament
99
but nothing· more. On the question of voting, the relevant
paragraph read as follows:
"Within the Council, every possible means of
facilitating the decision-making process will be
used, including, in cases where unanimity is
required, the possibility of abstaining from 
100
voting."
Moreover, the original Italo-German plan had propose>d
"linking preliminary consultations of the Ten more closely to
later common action; making reactions more timely; making
the so-called "acquis politique" more binding; improving
links with the European Parliament; strengthening the
presidency; creating a permanent small secretariat;
modifying the rules of consensus; and extending the scope of
cooperation to security and culture; thereby coordinating
respective national policies and creating an ad hoc body to
101
deal with them."
The Declaration on the other hand lacked all these 
credible means of progress towards European Union. Therefore 
Germany’s and Italy’s effort was downgraded to a declaration 
which simply described existing practices rather than 
envisaging any innovations. The declaration was far from 
realizing the expected institutional and political changes.
99 . ibj-_d . , p. 184.
100. Ifestos, p. 303.
101. Bonvicini, 1987, p. 185
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The cijstLnction between EC and EPC, the lack of bindiri'^  
obligations, exclusion of security mattei's to a certain 
degree and its institutional setting in short, the basic 
characteristics of EPC remained almost the same. However, 
one should also keep in mind tl-iat a declaration by its nature 
iS simply a means of expressing common political intentions 
and views of the EC members. It may, at best, have some 
politically binding character, but nothing mox'e.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF EPC 
A. Working Mechanisms
EPC was established to deal with foreign policy 
problems which the member states of the EC met in tht 
international arena. The aim was to be able to speak v.ith 
one voice on international questions, and in order to speak 
with one voice the member-states had to coordinate their 
views and positions and to reach a common line through 
reciprocal consultation and exxchange of information. Yet 
common institutions are not in a position to make and carrs' 
out all outstanding foreign policy decisions in the name of 
the Community. The parties to EPC are all sovereign states 
and they all preserve their own "national" foreign policies. 
The participants in EPC can interpret or realize common 
declarations differently, in accordance with their own day- 
to-day politics.
41
Although in all EPC reports and declarations, it is
clearly stated that European cooperation in the field of
foreign policy is aimed at contributing to the creation of a
so-called "European Union", this final goal, i.e, European
Union, lacks a clear definition in terms of both content and
102
structure and procedures. Intergovernmentalisni is another
concept that can be referred to in the field of foreign 
policy cooperation in Europe. In order to understand whether 
EPC is a mere elaboration of the intergovernmental approach 
or an advanced level of common foreign policy, I am going to 
examine the decision-making mechanisms and procedures of EPC, 
besides the role it assumes.
1. The Presidency
During the first two or three years of operation, the 
president’s role did not extend far beyond convening meetings 
of Ministers and of the Political Committee; attempting to 
promote compromise among divergent viewpoints, carrying out 
contact with states that have applied for accession and 
meeting the press on behalf of his colleagues at the
102. Gianni Bonvicini, "Mechanisms and Procedures of EPC:
More than Traditional Diplomacy?" in: European Political
Cooperation in the 1980s. A Common Foreign Policy for 
Western Europe? ed. A. Pijpers, E. Regelsberger and 
W. Wesseis. Dordrech: 1988, p. 50.
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iUJ
conclusion of each ministe'rial conference. As political
cooperation expanded due to the growing complexity of the EPC
machinery, the Presidency played a larger role. The
intergovernmental character of EPG was another factor which
104
caused the Presidency to take a central role. The
efficiency of political cooperation depended to a large
extent on that of the Presidency since the decision-making
structure was deprived of a well-established bureaucratic
base and also a common budget for EPC. As a result, each
member state, according to its financial capability,
105
dficided how to utilise its period in office.
The Copenhagen Report of 1973 recognized the fact that
"the Presidency’s task presents a particularly heavy
106
administrative burden". As a result, the Report
introduced for the first time the possibility of
administrative assistance to the Presidency, provided by
107
other member states, i.e. European Correspondents.
103. William Wallece, "National Inputs into European
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Europäische Politik, Bonn: 1982, p. 49.
104. Bonvicini, 1988, p. 59.
105. ibid., p. 59.
106. Wallace, p. 49.
107. Philippe de Schoutheete,
Management of Political
Political Cooperation in the 1980s A Common Foreign 
Policy fpx Western Europe, ed. A. Pijpers, E. 
Regelsberger and W. Wessels, (Dordrecht: 1988) p. 71;
"The Presidency and the 
Cooperation" in: European
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Moreover the "Gymnich formula" placed the responsibility
for representing European views in the hands of the
Presidency. The formula required the Presidency, in the
name of the member states of the Community, to take charge
of the process of informing and consulting allied and
109
friendly nations.
Thus the Presidency, that is the Foreign Minister
and his administration of the country holding the office of
the President in the Community Council, became both the
"driving force" and the "spokesman" of cooperation in foreign
policy. The representational duties gave each foreign
minister and his officials an opportunity to play a larger
110
and more visible role on the international stage.
Yet these tasks imposed a real burden particularly on
the small countries when they occupied the Presidency during
111
the six-month period. Another problem was the continuity
of EPC beyond the six-month period of each Presidency. The 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 especially showed the 
inability of the Community to react to events taking place
108
108. The Gymnich Agreement (April 1974) was
which made it possible to link the
consultations. By this agreement, it
"Whenever one of the Nine wished
consultations on a certain topic, prov 
states agreed, the presidency
consultations with the USA before politi 
wei'e finalized" (Beate Kohler, 
Relations and EPC", in: EPC. Towards a
for Western Europe. Bonn: 1982, p. 88
109. Schoutheete, p. 72.
110. Wallace, p. 51.
111. Stein, p. 54.
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during the juncture of two Presidencies. That is why the
Foreign Ministers in the London Report of 1981 agreed that
"the Presidency will be assisted by a small team of officials
seconded from preceding and succeeding Presidencies" and
assigned to the staff of their embassies in the Presidency
capital as a further means of alleviating its burden. The
President was also given the permission to delegate certain
113
tasks to his successor or predecessor. The SEA of 1986
despite the establishment of a political secretariat,
confirmed the dominant role of the Presidency as: the
maintenance, coordination and management of EPC in foreign
policy and the representation of the member states in the
114
international arena.
Since EPC is based on the consensus principle the
Presidency is obliged to hear all its partners before it
announces an official declaration, prepares proposals for
resolutions and reports, addresses itself in the name of the
Twelve at international conferences and organizations, or
gives answers to the, questions of European
115
Parliamentarians. He has to establish, at the end of his
term, a summary of declarations and documents adopted during 
the six-months which all together constitute the records of
112
112. Greilsammer, p. 58.
113. Stein, pp. 54-55.
114. Greilsammer, p. 59.
115. Elfriede Regelsberger, "From Ten to Twelve- A New. 
Dimension for European Political Cooperation (EPC)", in: 
The International Spectator. July-Dee. 1985, Vol: 10,
No: 3/4, p. 43.
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political cooperation. As well as this he fixes the dates and
agendas of the meetings. He has the right and duty to
initiate discussions. Another task of the Presidency is the
preparation of the records of all meetings at whatever level.
He is also responsible for political cooperation among the
116
diplomatic representations of the Twelve abroad.
The functioning of EPC thus depends on the ability of
the respective Presidency to run all these mechanisms. The
negotiation process going on at different levels of political
cooperation; working group levels, political committee or
ministerial meetings is not a "zero-sum game". The member-
states have to arrive at a common position, a declaration or
117
a collective action. Here the Presidency plays a
fundamental role, depending on his personality and dynamism,
in reaching a sort of conciliation while overcoming
differences of approach, rivalries, conflicts of interest,
118
priorities of domestic politics, of each member state.
Besides the personal qualities of the Presidency, such as
judgement, tact, ability and personal knowledge, the
domestic political situation of that country which holds the
119
Presidency is a significant factor. If a government
crisis or similar political hitch coincides
116. Schoutheete
117. ibid., P· 78.
118. ibid., P· 79.
119. ibid., P· 79.
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with the period of the presidency, this causes negative 
impacts and diverging results on the efficiency of EPC
procedures. These can be considered as the weak points of
the system.
In the area of political cooperation the presidency 
exercises an unshared power in terms of management,
initiative, execution, external representation, and search 
for compromise. Thus the effectiveness of political 
coop(!ration depended to a large extent on that of the 
presidency. Each step in the development of political
cooperation has been marked by an increase in the
presidency’s authority. With regard to its powers and
responsibilities, the presidency has a certain element of 
originality. The guiding role of the presidency makes it 
easiei- to take decisions by reconciling different positions 
of the Twelve within an intergovernmental process.
2. The Secretariat
The Single European Act of 1986 modified the structures
of political cooperation and provided an institutional
120
instrument in the form of a secretariat.
According to the functions -whether political or 
organizational- undertaken by the secretariat, its structure 
can be called "strong" or "light". The? SEA established a
120. Research Group on European Affairs, European Deficits, 
European Perspectives: Taking Stock for Tomorrow,
Bertelsmann Foundation Publ., Gütersloh: 1989, p.l33
47
light secretariat since its role is restricted to
121
organizational tasks.
The presidency system has been encountering with some sort
of administrative constraints. First of all, a member state
has to wait for six years to reassume the Presidency.
Secondly, the same member state, after waiting for six
years, can hold the office only for six months. Thirdly,
while procedures are developing, national officials are
122
constantly changing. In order to overcome these problems
a specialized permanent body was created which is held
responsible for providing a back-up for the day-to-day
problems of political cooperation, and which is in a way
helping the presidency to compose its thoughts and to store a
"body of knowl-edge" that was in danger of dying with the 
123
"troika" Among the functions of the Secretariat are:
a. assisting the Presidency in the organization of political 
cooperation meetings, including the preparation ¿ind 
circulation of documents and the drawing up of minutes;
b. working with the European Correspondents group;
c. assisting the chairman of the working groups;
121. The British and the Italians were supporting a "light" 
secretariat where as the French proposed a "strong" 
one which deals with political issues.
122. P.S. da Costa Pereira, "The Use of a Secretariat,"
in: European Political Cooperation in the 1980s A
Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?, ed.
A: Pi.jpers, E. Regelsberger, and W. Wessels,
(Dordrecht: 1988), pp. 93-94.
123. ibid.. p. 94.
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d. assisting the Presidency in the preperation of texts to 
be published on behalf of the member states, including 
replies to parliamentary questions;
e. maintaining the European Political Cooperation archives;
f. preserving the rules according to which political 
cooperation operates;
g. assisting the Presidency in its contacts with third 
countries;
h. organizing on its premises all working party meetings
and, if necessary, meetings of the Ministers and the
124
Political Committee.
The member states appoint the "secretariat head" for a
three-year term of office. Coordinating the secretariat’s
activities and establishing high-level contacts with external
bodies, particularly with the Political Directors, are
125
among his responsibilities. There are also "five civil
servants" who are diplomats in their national bureaucracies
and enjoy the status of the member states’ diplomatic
126
delegations to which they belong administratively. They
are appointed by their governments for terms of two -and- a- 
half years according to an "extended troika formula, and
exercise their functions under the auspices of the state
124. ibid., P· 93.
125. ibid., P· 87.
126. ibid., P· 87.
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holding the presidency of the Community. The Seci-etarici
does not have its own budget; some of its expenses are met
from the Community budget, while other costs are Vjorn by
national administrations and by political cooperation (i.e.
the presidency). I f we take into consideration the diffei'ent
levels of wealth among the member states we can conclude
that the secretariat remains entirely dependent on the 
128
Presidency. In addition to that it does not have its own
diplomatic network to supply high-quality information, for
this it has to rely on the respective national diplomatic
129
services and the press. It lacks a free circulation of
information within the secretariat which otherwise create
its own esprit de corps. The secretariat was created to
assist the successive Presidencies in exercising their
responsibilities. It also serves as an advisor to the
Pi'esidency on its actions in general. Moreover, the
secretariat may influence decision-making by organizing
archives, presenting past experience in one way or another,
providing an element of continuity in foreign policy action
and serving as a catalyst or initiator of decisions or by
130
setting up obstacles to decisions.
127
127. Greilsammer, p. 58.
128. Costa Pereira, p. 86.
129. ibid., p. 88.
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EPC. The presence of a limited but permanent staff
specialized in questions of political cooperation is worth to 
131
consider. Its creation is based on pragmatic reasons. It
is at the service of the presidency.and has no autonomy. It
deals mainly with the issues which are perceived as less
important by the Presidency. Yet the secretariat may
develop gradually now that the SEA has established a deeper
coordination between EPC and the Community. The secretariat
is located in Brussels in the same building as the Council
of the EC. In spite of a greater geographical distance
between the secretariat and the Foreign Ministry holding the
presidency, its proximity to the Community institutions may
contribute to the declared aim of the "cohesion" of EPC and
132
EC (Art 30 (5) SEA). Due to its ideal situation in
relation to the Community institutions in terms of distance,
it promises to play a greater role in furthering European
Union where the policies of EPC and the Community must be in
133
coordination. At least it possess this potential.
3. The Coreu (Correspondance Europeanne)
One of the aims of EPC was to link directly Foreign
Ministers and their Ministries throughout European 
134
capitals. Within each Ministry of Foreign Affairs a
The Secretariat is the only institutional setting of
131. Schoutheete, p. 82.
132. Regelsberger, 1988, p. 33
133. Costa Pereira, p. 101.
134. Regelsberger, 1988, p. 11
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"European correspondent" coordinates the EPC work under the
supervision of the Political Director. These diplomats
constitute a "group of European Correspondents" which takes
care of the procedural and organizational matters and
135
prepares papers for the higher-level meetings. This group
functions as an advisory body regarding the actual
136
organization of EPC. They also help to coordinate EPC
activities at both the European and the national levels,
esi)ecially between various sections of national Foreign
137
Affairs Ministries. These links have been gradually
extended to the embassies of the member states in third 
138
countries.
In order to facilitate continuing contacts a special
coded telex system i.e. CORED (correspondance européenne)
was installed in mid-1973 between the Foreign Ministries of
Membtir States. In this way, exchange of information began
139
to be carried out on a quasi- permanent basis. Moreover,
the CORED telex network has linked the foreign ministries of
the Member States in such a way that they do not always
need to rely for their consultations on the relatively
140
cumbersome embassy system. This has led to a
135 . Stein., p. 53.
136. Greilsammer, p. 57.
137. Bonvicini, 1988, p. 56.
138. Regelsberger, 1988, p. 11.
139. ibid., p. 11.
140. Hill, p. 48.
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"coordination reflex", wheretjy no country takes an important
step in external relations without first discussing the
141
matter inside the Community. The growth rate of this
telex system has risen enormously to nearly 10.000 messages a 
142
year by 1986.
The growing demand for information and consultation
among the Foreign Services varies over time but an increase
in demand has placed a considerable burden on the member
stales which have the task of chairing EPC. It has created
difficulties for the smaller countries and those lacking
143
bureaucratic and technical resources. Therefore the
"group of European Correspondents" is normally is backed up
by personnel from other divisions during the time of a
presidency, in order to cope with the overload and enlarged
responsibility at that time. As mentioned above, the
European Correspondent, who is often a young junior
official, acts as the first assistant of the Political
Director. His position underlines the flexibility and
144
peculiar character of the EPC-decision-making structure.
Yet, till 1986, the pi'esence of this small unit was one of
the major obstacles in the establishment of a permanent
secretariat, because of the fears about further
145
bureaucratization. However, after the establishment of
141. ibid., p. 48
142. Regelsberger,
143. Bonvicini, 1
144. ibid., p. 56
145. ibid., p. 57
p. 34. 
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Correspondent begem also to cooperate very closely with the
secretariat, as he has been working with his Political
146
Director. The European Correspondent of the country
holding the presidency acts as a kind of filter for the 
secretariat’s output as well.
Needless to say, EPC has developed important
instruments to reach a common line in terms of foreign 
policy. The secretariat and the COREU and their working 
metiiods are based on the same principle which shapes EPC,
i.e. pragmatism. Yet still the most important role is
played by the presidency by reconciling the different 
attitudes and interests of the member states. These 
institutions, the presidency, the secretariat and the 
COREU, act as flexible and pragmatic instruments to adjust 
EPC to political circumstances, and to the needs and goals 
of European integration. They contribute to the consensus - 
building and cooperation processes.
the Secretariat by the SEA in 1986, the European
B. EPC and the Institutions and Policy Measures of the 
Community.
There has been always a separation of EPC from the 
well-established procedures of the European Community. The 
progress toward establishing a relationship between these two
146. Costa Pereiva, p. 95.
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systems has been slow. This separation also reflects the
division of competences within the foreign ministries of the
member governments. The organizational division between
political and economic directorates within each foreig’n
ministry, has reinforced the distinction between the two
sets of procedures: the one in Brussels, the other
travelling successively around the capitals of the member- 
147
states. Yet the same individuals, i.e. the Heads of
Government in the European Council and the Foreign Ministers,
148
deal with both EPC and Community matters. However,
different and separate staffs do the prepatory work through
149
different procedures. Although the Community and
Political Cooperation cannot be separated logically, in 
institutional terms the responsibilities in the two fields 
remain strictly divided: Whereas E]PC affairs still remain
the responsibility of the Presidency’s administration
assisted by the newly created secretariat, the Council of the 
EC disposes of its own general secretariat at Brussels for 
all administrative matters.
Coordination between Political Cooperation and
Community activities has become a necessity, since the
147,
148
149
Wallace, p. 48.
In the past, foreign ministers sometimes had to fly 
from one capital to Brussels or Luxemburg in order to 
emphasize the legal distinction between a meeting of 
the Community and a meeting of political cooperation. 
Stein. , p. .56 .
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declared aim of political cooperation is the same as that of
Community cooperation, i.e. the political unification of 
150
Europe. Besides, from a ne;^ otiatirig point of viev/ there
is interdependenc;e between economic and foreign policy. It
is difficult to consider certain policies such as energy
policy, Mediterranean policy, the Euro-Arab dialogue,
relations with the U.S.A., and the CSCE process, as problems
where the economic aspects of policy can be rigidly separated
151
from the foreign policy'· questions.
The Community is not a non-political entity. EPC
derives much of its importance fiom the fact that the
Community is the largest trading bloc in the world. The EC
has carried on external relations although foreign policy
152
lies outside the scope of the Rome Treaty. Its external
relations cannot be defined in strictly apolitical terms
since the EC’s foreign economic decision-making powers are
supported by the members’ vital political-diplomatic-security
153
interests abroad. The decision to grant or withold
foreign trade contracts, tariff preferences other favourable
150
151
152
153.
Gianni Bonvicini, "The Dual Structure of EPC and 
Community Activities: Problems of Coordination", in:
European Poli t Leal Cooperation: Towards a Foreign
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trade terms, diplomatic recognition and food-humanitarian-
emergency aid to third countries, entails political-
diplomatic-security calculations on the part of the 
154
Twelve.
1. The Commission
With respect to the relations of EPG with the
Community, the Commission is the px'edominant institution.
The main role of the Commission in EPC is "to act as a bridge
155
with the Community". It has to make the Community
framework, but the reverse is true as well. The Community
is informed through the,· Commission about the political
framework drawn in EPC discussions.
The Commission, rather than a full participant, has
always been an observer in EPC. It is expected to contribute
in cases where there is advantage in combining the
156
Community’s political and economic potential. Yet it
has been excluded from whole areas of EPC and from certain
types of activity, since up to the SEA there has been no
precise rule establishing' the Commission’s right to
157
participate in political cooperation.
154. ibid., p . 2 7 5.
155. Simon Nuttall, "Where the Europea'n Commission Comes
in", in: European Political Cooperation in the 1980s;
A C^ inmon Foreign Policy for Western Europe?, ed. A . 
Pijpers, E. Regelsberger, W. Wessels, Dordrecht: 
1988, p. 107.
156. Nuttall, p. 104.
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The opinion of the Council Presidency and of the
Political Committee has been decisively important in
158
determining the Commission’s role , as its role depends
159
on a tacit invitation from the presidency. Although the
1981 London Report had attached importance to the Commission
as being fully associated with EPC at all levels, and the
Stuttgart Declaration of 1983 confirmed it, only with the
SEA did the right to participate achieve a legal basis.
From then on the Commission began to take its place
in EPC meetings at all levels. The President of the
Commission is a member of the European Council and a member
of the Commission takes part in EPC ministerial meetings.
Since the end of 1987 a Director in the Secretariat Genei'al
is the representative of the Commission in the Political
Committee, moreover he is responsible for all forms of
160
intergovernmental cooperation, including EPC. Since 1982
the Commission has been directly linked with the COREL'
network and thereby it receives all COREL'S and can send these 
161
by itself. The Commission is also represented by its
delegations at coordination meetings of member states’
158. ibid., p. 39.
159. The CSCE case was an exception since in May 1971 the 
six foreign ministers decided in Paris to involve thei EEC 
Commission in this work by establishing a special ad hoc 
CSCE working group within the framework of EPC 
including representatives from the Commission as well.
160. Nut tall, p. 106.
161. ibid., p. 106.
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dipiomatic missions in countries outside the Community, and
a higher degree of intergration has been achieved abroad than
162
it has been possible to achieve centrally. Besides, the
presence of the Commission in the Troika is important to
present an overall picture of EPC and Community policy and
also to give; the image; of a unifieel political and economic 
163
Community. The Commission is the only "permanent dialogue
partner" on the European side, because of the X'otation of
164
the Presidency.
2. The European Parliament
Although the European Parliament has "political"
control over the Commission under the Community Ireaties, it
does not have such power with respect to EiPC and its
functions are entirely advisory in accordance with the EPC 
165
documents. It remains a speaking platform, a sort of
pressure group, but not part of the machinery in the
166
decision-making process. Even the SEA of 1986 did not
introduce any pi'ogress in this direction. The Single Act 
speaks of a "close association" with the Parliament. Yet 
this is limited to assuring that the Parliamentarians have 
access to information and to expressing the desire that
162. ibid., p. 107.
163. ibid., P· 110.
164. ibid. , P· 110.
165. Stein, P· 59.
166. Greiisammer . P
59
167
their views be taken into account. So in a way a sort of
dialogue between the Parliament and the state that holds the
168
presidency of the EPC is assured.
3. Policy Measures
Once the Ministers or the Heads of Government reach a
decision at the end of a meeting, this decision may take the
form of a "declaration", an EPC "demarche" with a third
state, a "mandate" to the President-in-office to·undertake a
diplomatic mission, or an "agreement on a common position"
to be taken at an international conference or in an
international organization, or even a "common guidance" for 
169
nationals (e.g. the Common Code of Conduct of 1977 for
national business enterprises working in South Africa).
However, when the EC countries are forced to go beyond 
their policy of declaratory diplomacy, their reactions to
international
heterogeneity
crisis are directly affected by their
170
and their limited room of manoeuvre.
167. ibid., p. 68.
168. Generally speaking, art. 237 and art. 238 of the EEC 
Treaty in its revised form of the SEA gives the EP some 
foreign policy authority with respect to the conclusion 
of treaties with third countries. And if the member 
states want to use such a treaty as a measure of 
realizing common foreign policy aims the EP could under 
certain circumstances become "directly" involved in EPC 
matters.
1 6 9 . Stein, p . 6 1 .
170. Regelsberger, 1985, p. 37.
60
Specific riationai interests among the member states like
Irish neutrality, Denmark’s reservations towards a
"political" community, Greece’s independent course in
171
foreign policy have to be specially mentioned. The member
countries despite some limitations and shoi'tcoming’s still try
to answer the international challenges by a strategy of
"speaking with one voice" and are in favour of international
1 72
cooperation instead of confrontation. As H.D. ■ Genscher in 
his speech at the UN General Assembly on 26 September 1987 
emphasized, they wish to become "a centre of cooperation in 
the world, founded on equality and partnership."
However, EPC lacks instruments of its own for
implementing a common position, so that it has to rely on
member states who hold a wide range of such means, and on
the Community with its budget and commercial and economic
173
development policies powers. This is one of the main
weaknesses of EPC. On the other hand there are varying 
attitudes among the member states toward the use of Community
171. ib Id., p. 37.
172. Elfriede Regelsberger, "The Dialogue of the EC/Twelve
with other Groups of States", in: The International
Spectator, vo1: XXIII,
173. Stein, p. 64.
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policies as instruments, although they are aware of the
economic potential of the EC as an asset to any European
I 7 4
foreign policy. Since the member states in common lack
one of the main instruments of foreign policy, i.e. a
unified armed force, they rely on financial incentives,
tariff advantages, commercial rewards, or on negative
175
economic sanctions and punishments. However, imposition
of economic sanctions against a third state creates problems 
of interaction between the EPC, the Community and the Member 
States.
As a matter of fact, the Rome Treaty of 1957 does
not explicitly bind members to a common foreign policy, in
other words, it does not mention politics. Nevertheless,
the preamble states that members "are determined to lay the
foundation of an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe" which suggests the prospect of a "political 
176
union".
Another point is that EEC Treaty Art. 224 says that 
the member states may act individually in the event of 
"serious international tension constituting threat of war", 
or in order to carry out obligations for maintaining peace 
and international security; furthermore, it foresees
174 . Pardalis, p· 280
175 . Greilsammer, p.
176. Pardaiis, p. 275
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consultations if sanctions are likely to affect the
177
functioning of Common Market. Ne\"ertheless, Greilsammer
argues that the Community has not developed a systemic
mechanism with respect to economic "rewards" for the states
that apply the principles proclaimed in EPC. For instance,
although countries like Greece, Spain and Portugal v/ere
rewarded Vjy acceptance in the EC for abandoning dictatorship,
otiier Third World countries were also granted commercial
advantages without considering whether there were democratic
processes or respect for human rights or international law
178
in those countries. Thus there exists the probleiin of
ineffectiveness of sanctions and aids bec£iuse of the mildness 
of the sanctions and because of the lack of concerted action 
by those who impose them. So anotiier shortcoming of EPC is 
that the mechanism of sanctions does not rest upon any legal 
basis but on group expectations of mutuality.
Recently the SEA of 1986 emphasizes the "coherence" 
between external policies at .the economic level and foreign 
policy. Art. 30 paragraph 5 says that "the external 
policies of the? European Community and the policies agreed in 
EPC must be consistent". The provisions of the Single Act 
reflect the reality of an ever growing interdependence of 
these two issues. In this way, issues of both "high" and 
"low" politics are brought together to improve Europe’s
177. Stein, p. 65.
178. Greiisammer, pp. 70-71.
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Lnternatjonal profile. Yet the ability of the Twelve to
transform their willingness into policy proposals and
concrete actions by "speaking with one voice" depends on
finding a common denominator, as well as on an increased
mutual interest and better knowledge of the activities of
the various actors. While offers in terms of trade
concessions and financial aid cause tensions among the member
states, measures of diplomatic support and consultations are
179
less connected.
The EC itself is such an open forum that states find
themselves compelled to view policy-making on Treaty related
issues in a narrow national perspective. Within EPC there is
more confidentiality and more room for discreet compromise
but EPC has been handicapped by the principle of
180
consensus. Moreover, in the case of EPC the tools
available at a distinctively "European" level of
implementation are limited. It seems that the ability of
Europeans to agree on declarations and general policy stances
181
is in itself a form of implementation. However, their
adherence to a common European stance at the declaratory 
level and their pursuit of more material national interests
179. Regelsberger, (The Dialogue of the EC/Twelve with 
other Groups of states) p. 257.
180. D. Alien and M. Smith, "Europe, the United States and
the Middle East: a Case Study in Comparative Policy
Making", in: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 
XXII, No.2, Dec 1983, p. 136.
181. i Vii.d . , p. 143.
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may show disparities. That is why translating'
declarations into economic commitments is a major achievement
on the part of the Community, The first sucess in terms of
joirit declarations and joint positions was the case of the
European Conference on Cooperation and Security (CSCE) in
which the Nine formulated a common strategy and took the
j.nitiative for the CSCE. They came together in one of the
very important areas of foreign policy. The signing of the
Final Act (1975) must be considered actual recognition of the
Community by the East as well. The Nine were perceived by
the smaller countries, seeking to counterbalance the
183
hegemony of the superpowers, as an attractive partner.
Another very important declaration was the Venice
Declaration of 1980 which recognized the principJ.es of
"Palestinian self determination" and "a negotiating role for
184
the PLO" and of Israel’s right to a secure existence.
This declaration is prominent among the public results of EPC
and it reflects the determination of Europe to continue its
efforts to find a way to peace since the stability and
prosperity of the future of Western Europe is closely bound
185
with that of the Middle East.
182
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The UN has also become an important area for EPC.
"Speaking with one voice" on world politics in the UN is
demonstrated either by unitary voting behaviour or through
.joint contributions to debates or by a bloc-veto declaration;
and not least by the regular appearance of the foreign
minister of the country holding the presidency as a "speaker"
for the Twelve in the general debate of the session of the
186
General Assembly each autumn. Yet on certain proposed
resolutions that are particularly crucial, the Twelve remain 
187
divided, Differences occur mainl.y on the subjects of
decolonization, disarmament, the Middle East, apartheid,
the new international economic order....etc. Yet since
1977 none of the members has voted in favour of a
resolution criticizing the actions of another member 
188
state. Despite their divergences, they have proved to be
a "coherent and effective group".
In achieving foreign policy objectives the Commission 
plays a special role since' EPC is in need of Community 
instruments in the form of sanctions or aid. If we take a 
brief look at the issue of economic sanctions we see that the 
Community countries as members of the UN, imposed sanctions 
for the first time against the illegal regime in
186
187
188
B.Lindemann, "EPC at the UN: A Challange For The
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Rhodesia. Due to the pressure from V/ashington they had
also took punitive steps on trade terras towards Iran aftei’
the seizure of American hostages. This example can be
190
considered as the first serious test. Following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan restrictions on trade were
191
introduced against the S.U., but they were limited.
Further measures were introduced against the S.U. by the
Community of the time of the imposition of martial iaxv in 
192
Poland.
The Falklands crisis was as a matter of fact a
fundamental development, since for the first time
economic sanctions were implemented by the Community
following a decision made within the framework of EPC.
Therefore Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands in
1982 marked the first real examjjle of collective European
sanctions. Moreover, sanctions were introduced without any
pressure from a non-member state and they marked a joint
determination to act in support of military action being
193
taken by one of the member states.
Unfortunately international teri'orlsm, xvhich
significantly affected Europe in the 1980s, did not evoke
189. Stein, p. 65.
190. Greilsammer, p. 71.
191. ibid., p. 72.
192. Nuttall, p. 112.
193. G. Edwards, "Europe and the Falkland Island Crisis 
1982, in: Jour rial pX Common Market Studies. Vol. 
XXII, No. 4, June 1984, p. 313.
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r'eal economic "reprisals" against Libj'a, Iran and Syria,
which were considered to give support to terrorist 
194
activities. Even in the case of South Africa sanctions
were insignificant and did not touch on the areas that could
have affected the Pretoria regime. Britain was opposed to
such sanctions and many others who were also reluctant took
195
shelter behind her.
On the other hand, a special credit was provided from
the Community budget to the Portuguese government in addition
to the economic negotiations with Portugal upon her
transition to pluralistic democracy in 1975. And
economic assistance to Indochina refugees in 1979 and the
supply of critical agricultural commodities at favorable
prices to Poland in 1980 were other examples of the
196
Community’s use of aid in pursuit of foreign policy goals.
We can conclude that on several occasions the Community’s 
economic policy has been an active support for initiatives in 
the field of political cooperation.
The Commission therefore fills the gap by searching out
opportunities and finding ways and means of implementing what
197
member states in EPC try to achieve. The Community
194. Greilsammer, p. 72.
195. ibid., p. 72.
196. Stein, p. 64.
197. Nuttali, p. 115.
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Tine Communlcy considers EPC as an instrument to develop and
198
maintain an independent European position. However, the
Twelve are unwilling to establish standing lules for
commitments or sanctions made for international politiciil
reasons by common consent, since they believe that there
is no need to put the budget, trading and agricultural
preictices of the EC to trouble for an unrelated purpose.
That may explain to a certain degree why sanctions have
Î99
been minimal and largely informal.
Lastly, we can draw attention to the ’'moral weight”
that the member states try to place in their joint
deciarations. It seems that the Europeans encourage the
democratization of authoritarian regimes, the installation
of pluralistic democracies, respect for human rights, and
200
the condemnation of violations of international law. Both
in terms of harmonization of their positions and of their 
declaratory diplomacy in international fora, or even in terms 
of common actions, they attempt to create a sort of "moral
f norce .
198. Pardalis, p. 281.
199. Ibid., p. 280.
200. Greilsammer, pp. 64-65.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
EPC and European Political Integration
Sirxce the 1970s the member states of the European
Communities have been trying to link theii' foreign policy
machinery, through creating some habits and methods of
problem-solving which have been taken up by other government
201
circles as well. In spite of their different attitudes,
EPC has become an important element in the; European 
integration process. EPC has passed through a sort of 
evolution during the last twenty years but it does not 
represent a qualitative leap forwai'd towards closer 
intégrât ion. It can rather be considered as a sui generis 
device; for co-ordinating and decision-making in foreigr; 
policy outside; EC competencies.
The decisions taken within the EPC process are not 
legally binding since it is not a treaty-bound body. Though 
some achievements cannot be denied, there exist also 
important limitations. One of them is that Political 
Cooperation is an exercise in "cooperation" and 
"coordination", but not a common foreign policy. The 
traditional instruments of foreign policy remain in the hands
201. A. Pijpers, E. Regelsberger and W. Wessels, "A Common 
Foreign Policy for Western Europe?" in: European
Pol itical Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign 
Policy for Western Europe? ed. A. Pijpers, E. 
Regelsberger and W. Wessels, Dordrecht: 1988, p. 269.
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of the member states, as well as the right to make decisions
202
on foreign policy questions. A truly common foreign
policy would consist of several instruments of diplomacy,
such as political, military, economic and cultural, besides
common financing and a decision-making centre. The most far
reaching obligations, however, undertaken by member states
in EPC are advance consultation with partners before
decisions are made and the commitment to the objective of
203
achieving a common position if possible. That is why the
field of political cooperation is perceived as "foreign
204
diplomacy" rather than a "foreign policy".
It is functioning as a negotiating forum and
coordinating European diplomatic activities. It is rather a 
flexible and pragmatic approach where each member state 
continues to express its own view regarding international 
politics, after consultations with other members. But this 
characteristic of EPC is worth considering as an achievement 
in an Interdependent world where the role of the nation state 
is questioned. As a matter of fact, EPC is considered as a
202
203
204
Douglas Hurd, "Political Cooperation", in:
International Affairs. vol. 57, Summer 1981, No: 3, 
p. 386.
Ibid., p. 386.
J. Weiler and W. Wessels, "EPC and the Challenge of 
Theory", in: European Political Cooperation in the
1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe? ed.
A. Pijpers, E. Regelsberger and W. Wessels, 
Dordrecht: 1988, p. 235.
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European contribution to the search for new diplomatic 
techniques in an international arena where group diplomacy 
plays a growing role. EPC has contributed to the improvement 
of member governments’ room for manoeuvre and to an increase 
in their influence on international developments by providing 
them with a detailed knowledge of their partners’ viewpoints. 
Thus it widens its members’ persi>ectives and facilitates 
the decision-making process, since the behaviour of the 
partners become more transparent and more predictable.
That is why some scholars and statesmen consider the 
so-called "coordination reflex" developed among the foreign 
ministries of the member states and their diplomats as one of 
the utmost successes of EPC. Philippe de Schoutheete is one 
of them who argues that:
"The EPC brings a new element by systematically
multiplying the direct contacts among the
different levels, administrative and political,
those responsible for decisions in each of the
member states. This way, it introduces a new
European dimension in a process which previously
was exclusively based on national
20v5
considerations. "
205. P. de Schoutheete, La Cooperation Politique Européenne, 
Brussels: 1980, p. 118, quoted in Ifestos, p. 83.
(translation by Ifestos).
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Furthermore, thanks to the system of the rotating
presidency, EPC offers the possibility of a higher profile to
a membei' with I'espect to its national and international role.
It can also be used as a shield against pressure from third 
206
countries. Particularly, the "smaller" ones in the
Community benefit from the EPC "club" offering much more
information on international developments than a government
would be able to gather alone. In times of crisis EPC is
given a high priority by all members, whereas· in times of
normal foreign policy business participants find it
difficult to make a choice between collective diplomacy and
national independence. Yet successful EPC activity has been
limited to relatively minor issues, with the exception of
its role in the CSCE process, since the Twelve are not able
to reach consensus on a range of important issues,
overcoming their policy divergences. It has served as an
alibi for inaction of individual countries when asked to get
involved, a collective shelter against the call for a more
active foreign policy. Thereby the EPC coalition protects
207
national sovereignties.
One point should always be born in mind: namely, that
Europe may never achieve progress on the way to T:>olitical 
integration if member states put short-term national
206.
207.
E. Regelsberger, "Spain and the European Political . 
Cooperation-No Enfant Terrible", in: The International 
Spectator. Vol. XXIV, No:2, April-June 1989, p. 120. 
Weiler and Wessels, p. 253.
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interests above common values and goals. As long as
participants look for immediate profits the whole system may 
suffer from immobility. In addition to the questions on 
which the Twelve do not agree, there are some problem areas 
which are not even discussed. That is why Political
Cooperation is far from being "comprehensive". EPC refrains 
from interfering both in conflicts between member states e.g. 
Northern Ireland and in sensitive and vital ai*eas such as 
de fence.
Certainly a foreign policy that has no security
208
dimension is incomplete and unsatisfactory. Because of the 
reservations of some EPC members -Ireland, Denmark and 
Greece- to make progress towards a coherent concept of a 
European security policy, the potential of EPC seems to be 
z'ather limited for the future. Although the "civilian power" 
Europe seems to be an attractive partner for cooperation
since it offers equal partnership in a regional grouping,
the "heaviness" of the decision-making process in a system 
with a dozen actors based on -the consensus principle can not 
be overlooked. Nevertheless, no government seems willing to 
change the current decision making process by introducing 
the majority voting principle which was proposed in the 
Tindemans Report.
208. A. Cahen, "Consequences of the EC Enlargements for 
Political Cooperation, in: The Jerusalem Journal of 
International Relations. Baltimore, Vol. 10, No:3, 
.Sept. 1988, p. 6.
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From ail this it can be concluded that the record for 
EPC with respect to political integration is rather mixed. 
Despite the sviccesses in terms of "communauté d’ information" 
(i.e. the exchange of information and views) and "communauté 
de vues" (i.e. the agreement on common viewpoints), EPC has 
failed mainly, in terms of "communauté d ’action" (i.e. 
decisions and the Implementation of concrete policies.) EPC 
has remained rather deciai'atory for the time being. However, 
member states have gained "the habit of working together" 
through political cooperation, and even a certain degree of 
"unity", in addition to increased intergovernmental political 
cooperation and coordination within the European framework. 
Yet European Union is still a goal to be achieved.
As a matter of fact, the non-binding character of EPC in
legal terms, and its nature based on the consensus of ail
members and of the acquis (i.e. the formulation of basic
principles and general guide-lines), leaving room for
different interpretations, make p>articipation attractive
even if a country prefers to follow an autonomous course in
209
foreign policy. As a result, it can be argued that EPC
is assumed to contribute positively to the creation of 
preconditions for "European political integration". 
Therefore EPC has still a promising future as a major
209. Regelsberger, "From Ten to Twelve: A New Dimension for
EPC", p. 44.
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pLllar of a United Europe. It represents a strategy for
initiating· arid developing common endeavours in the area of
210
foreign policy, but not a process which will trring
European political integration by.itself.
That is why in dealing with characteristics of EPC
the explanatory value of various integration theories are
limited. Although it is accepted as a positive input in to
Europejan integration, it does not fit in traditional
formulas of integration theory. "It is ' less than
211
supranational, but more than intergovernmental". The
objective of EPC is not simply to abolish gradually the
member states and establish ultimately a supranational
authority in Europe. On the contrary, its aim is to
maximize inter-state cooperation and search for common-
denominator solutions to the common problems facing 
212
Europe. It may not be fully institutionally linked with
the European Community, but its establishment and 
development is surely related to the European integration 
process. In particular, the parallel membership of the 
states in EPC and the EEC, where they are tied with multiple 
cultural, economic and social ties, and the linking of EPC 
and Community politics, have an outstanding impact, bearing 
in mind the characterization of EPC as intergovernmental
210. Cahen, p. 17.
211. Ifestos, p. 211.
212. i. .b i d . , p . 208.
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noL only wrong but inadequate.
Collective foreign-policy making at tne Eui'opean level,
contrary to neo-functionalist theory, does not imply an
automatic transfer of competencies from the national to the
Community level. It may be better defined as a "pooling" and
"mixing" of national sovereignty with the powers assigned to 
214
EC. According to the traditional federalist arguments,
different levels of government should be responsible for the
matters under their own jurisdiction and should be separate
in their spheres of activity. However, in EPC mechanism
national and Community levels of authority share the
responsibility for problem solving. Each of them supplement
the other in terms of instruments and legal competence in
dealing with problems. As a consequence, governments and
their bureaucracies are now involved in a permanent process
215
of transnational negotiations.
The member states neither involve a loss of national 
sovereignty nor limit themselves to their traditional 
national diplomacy. In a world of global interdependence a 
sort of collective problem-solving seems to be preferable as 
a strategy in preserving national interests than are
213
213.
214.
215.
Wessels, p. 15.
S. Bulmer and W. Wessels, The European Council. 
Decision-Making in European Politics, Houndmills and 
London 1987, p. 10.
R. Pryce and W. Wessels, p. 13.
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individual attempts. But at the same time, this collective
approach means "give and take" by limiting the autonomy in
foreign policy which is highly esteemed in the traditional
perceptions of the sovereign nation states in Western 
216
Europe. Therefore EPC helps to promote "community­
building" in Western Europe, while there is a general trend 
towards a "regionalization" of international politics in 
today’s world. It has enlarged the ways of solving problems 
in addition to both Community and national procedures, but
has not become a substitute for managing either Community or
217
national affairs.
It can be argued that member states definitely
refrain from making a choice between intergovernmental
cooperation and supranational integration, but pursue them
in parallel, trying to tie the stronger elements of both
218
methods together. Thus the reality of EPC could be an
additional incentive to revise theories of integration and to
seek new approaches, since EPC is an independent but not
219
isolated European phenomenon.
216. Regelsberger, (The Dialogue of the EC/twelve with 
other Groups of states) p. 256.
217. Pijpers, Regelsberger and Wessels, p. 269.
218. ibid., p. 269.
219. Wesseis, p. 16.
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